



# C.S.B. di ECONOMIA

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## Bibliografia delle opere di Elinor Ostrom

*[le opere sono elencate in ordine cronologico inverso, ove disponibile è stato incluso l'abstract.  
Fonte: Database Econlit consultazione del 13/10/2009]*

*Per l'accesso ai documenti è possibile contattare l'ufficio reference.*

<1>

1056271

Autori:

Janssen, Marco A; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Adoption of a New Regulation for the Governance of Common-Pool Resources by a Heterogeneous Population.

Sta in:

Recent Developments in Ecological Economics. Volume 2.. Martinez-Alier, Joan. Ropke, Inge, eds., Elgar Reference Collection. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: Elgar. p 320-56. 2008. Previously Published: 2007.

Update Code

200908

<2>

1055993

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Developing a Method for Analyzing Institutional Change.

Sta in:

Alternative Institutional Structures: Evolution and Impact. Batie, Sandra S. Mercurio, Nicholas, eds., Economics of Legal Relationships series. London and New York: Taylor and Francis, Routledge. p 48-76. 2008.

Update Code

200908

<3>

1035626

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Unlocking Public Entrepreneurship and Public Economies.

Sta in:

World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER), Working Papers: DP2005/01. p 10 pages. 2005.

Update Code

200907

<4>

1040620

Autori:  
Schwab, David; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:  
The Vital Role of Norms and Rules in Maintaining Open Public and Private Economies.

Sta in:  
Moral Markets: The Critical Role of Values in the Economy. Zak, Paul J., ed., Foreword by Michael C. Jensen. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. p 204-27. 2008.

Update Code  
200905

<5>

.  
1010498

Autori:  
Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:  
Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms.

Sta in:  
Environmental Planning. van den Bergh, Jeroen C. J. M. Button, Kenneth. Nijkamp, Peter, eds., Elgar Reference Collection. Classics in Planning, vol. 8.. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: Elgar. p 278-99. 2007. Previously Published: 2000.

Update Code  
200904

<6>

.  
0980123

Autori:  
Ostrom, Elinor; Hess, Charlotte.

Titolo:  
A Framework for Analyzing the Knowledge Commons.

Sta in:  
Understanding Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory to Practice. Hess, Charlotte. Ostrom, Elinor, eds., Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press. p 41-81. 2007.

Update Code  
200904

<7>

.  
0980121

Autori:  
Hess, Charlotte; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:  
Introduction: An Overview of the Knowledge Commons.

Sta in:  
Understanding Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory to Practice. Hess, Charlotte. Ostrom, Elinor, eds., Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press. p 3-26. 2007.

Update Code  
200904

<8>

.  
0965184

Autori:  
Poteete, Amy R; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:  
Fifteen Years of Empirical Research on Collective Action in Natural Resource Management: Struggling to Build Large-N Databases Based on Qualitative Research.

Sta in:  
World Development. Vol. 36 (1). p 176-95. January 2008.  
Abstract

Many debates exist among social scientists that relate to the "best" way of collecting data about important theoretical questions. As scholars, who conduct individual case studies as well as participate in large-N studies combining qualitative and quantitative data, we recognize the value of each research strategy and trade-offs in choosing between them. We support the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods to build on the strengths of each. A meta-analysis of the scholarly literature indexed during 1990-2004 on collective action related to natural resource governance yielded strong evidence that small-N studies are still the dominant empirical method. The continued reliance on research designs with limited comparative scope reflects practical challenges that limit the quantity and geographic breadth of data that any one researcher can collect using field-based research. We discuss the relative merits and shortcomings of two strategies for overcoming those challenges: Meta-databases constructed from existing qualitative studies and large-N field-based studies. Resource constraints, career incentives, and, ironically, collective action problems among researchers currently limit adoption of these strategies.

Update Code

200904

<9>

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0942297

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor; Nagendra, Harini.

Titolo:

Tenure Alone Is Not Sufficient: Monitoring Is Essential.

Sta in:

Environmental Economics and Policy Studies. Vol. 8 (3). p 175-99. 2007.

Abstract

Many scholars call for the establishment of one kind of formal tenure--government ownership, privatization, or community control---as the way to solve problems associated with high levels of deforestation. This will not work without extensive and consistent monitoring of forest use. In this article, we draw on analyses of time-series remote images, on-the-ground social-ecological surveys of local stakeholders and their forests, and experimental laboratory studies to show that "protected" forests may not be protected in practice when tenure alone is deemed to be the "solution." When users themselves consider the rules in place to be legitimate, they are frequently willing to engage themselves in monitoring and sanctioning of uses considered illegal, even when related to government-owned property. When users are genuinely engaged in decisions about rules affecting their use, the likelihood of users to follow the rules and monitor others is much greater than when an external authority simply imposes rules. Simple formulas focusing on formal ownership, particularly ones based solely on public ownership of forested lands, will not solve the problems of resource overuse.

Update Code

200904

<10>

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0775044

Autori:

Gibson, Clark C; Williams, John T; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Local Enforcement and Better Forests.

Sta in:

World Development. Vol. 33 (2). p 273-84. February 2005.

Abstract

Current studies of local resource management examine many factors thought to be associated with good resource conditions. Despite the number of studies and the importance of such resources to millions of people worldwide, a lack of theory and hypothesis testing beyond the case level limits the lessons empirical studies offer. We argue that regular monitoring and sanctioning of rules--rule enforcement--is a necessary condition for successful resource management. We test our theory using data regarding 178 user groups and by pairing rule enforcement with other important factors: social capital, formal organization, and dependence on forest products.

Update Code

200904

<11>

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0793515

Autori:

Cardenas, Juan Camilo; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Que traen las personas al juego? Experimentos de campo sobre la cooperacion en los recursos de uso comun. (With English summary.)

Sta in:

Desarrollo y Sociedad. Vol. 0 (54). p 87-132. September 2004.

Update Code

200904

<12>

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0540942

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms.

Sta in:

Journal of Economic Perspectives. Vol. 14 (3). p 137-58. Summer 2000.

Abstract

I assume multiple types of players--"rational egoists," as well as "conditional cooperators" and "willing punishers"--in models of nonmarket behavior. I use an indirect evolutionary approach to explain how multiple types of players could survive and flourish in social dilemma situations. Contextual variables that enhance knowledge about past behavior assist in explaining the origin of collective action. Among the important contextual variables are types of goods, types of groups, and rules that groups use to provide and allocate goods. Finally, I reexamine a series of design principles that were derived earlier from an examination of extensive case materials.

Update Code

200904

<13>

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0851099

Autori:

Tucker, Catherine M; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Multidisciplinary Research Relating Institutions and Forest Transformations.

Sta in:

Seeing the Forest and the Trees: Human-Environment Interactions in Forest Ecosystems.

Moran, Emilio F. Ostrom, Elinor, eds., Cambridge and London: MIT Press. p 81-103. 2005.

Update Code

200904

<14>

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0851096

Autori:

VanWey, Leah K; Ostrom, Elinor; Meretsky, Vicky.

Titolo:

Theories Underlying the Study of Human-Environment Interactions.

Sta in:

Seeing the Forest and the Trees: Human-Environment Interactions in Forest Ecosystems.

Moran, Emilio F. Ostrom, Elinor, eds., Cambridge and London: MIT Press. p 23-56. 2005.

Update Code

200904

<15>

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0768006

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

The Study of Human-Ecological Systems in the Laboratory.

Sta in:

Sustainable agriculture in Central and Eastern European countries: The environmental effects of transition and needs for change. Gatzweiler, Franz W. Judis, Renate. Hagedorn, Konrad, eds., Institutional Change in Agriculture and Natural Resources, vol. 10. Aachen, Germany: Shaker. p 99-113. 2002.

Update Code

200904

<16>

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0790482

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor; Ahn, T. K.

Titolo:

The Foundations of Social Capital: Introduction.

Sta in:

Foundations of social capital. Ostrom, Elinor. Ahn, T. K., eds., Elgar Reference Collection. Critical Studies in Economic Institutions, vol. 2. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: Elgar; distributed by American International Distribution Corporation, Williston, Vt.. p xi-xxxix. 2003.

Update Code

200904

<17>

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0784822

Autori:

Walker, James; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Trust and Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary Lessons from Experimental Research: Conclusion.

Sta in:

Trust and reciprocity: Interdisciplinary lessons from experimental research. Ostrom, Elinor. Walker, James, eds., Series on Trust, vol. 6. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. p 381-87. 2003.

Update Code

200904

<18>

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0784819

Autori:

Ahn, T. K; Ostrom, Elinor; Schmidt, David; Walker, James.

Titolo:

Trust in Two-Person Games: Game Structures and Linkages.

Sta in:

Trust and reciprocity: Interdisciplinary lessons from experimental research. Ostrom, Elinor. Walker, James, eds., Series on Trust, vol. 6. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. p 323-51. 2003.

Update Code

200904

<19>

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0784809

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Toward a Behavioral Theory Linking Trust, Reciprocity, and Reputation.

Sta in:

Trust and reciprocity: Interdisciplinary lessons from experimental research. Ostrom, Elinor. Walker, James, eds., Series on Trust, vol. 6. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. p 19-79. 2003.

Update Code

200904

<20>

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0601781

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Social Capital: A Fad or a Fundamental Concept?

Sta in:

Social capital: A multifaceted perspective. Dasgupta, Partha. Serageldin, Ismail, eds., Washington, D.C.: World Bank. p 172-214. 2000.

Update Code

200904

<21>

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0821823

Autori:

Moran, Emilio F; Ostrom, Elinor, eds.

Titolo:

Seeing the Forest and the Trees: Human-Environment Interactions in Forest Ecosystems.

Sta in:

Cambridge and London: MIT Press. p xiii, 442. 2005.

Abstract

Twelve papers present the results of research into land-use/land-cover change, particularly human-forest interactions, conducted at the Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental Change, Indiana University, and provide insight into why some forests are thriving while others are declining and becoming degraded. Papers focus on theories underlying the study of human-environment interactions; useful concepts and approaches for land-cover change studies; multidisciplinary research relating institutions and forest transformations; forest ecosystems and the human dimensions; retrieving land-cover change information from Landsat satellite images by minimizing other sources of reflectance variability; human-environment research, spatially explicit data analysis, and geographic information systems; modeling land-use/land-cover change; intraregional analysis of land-use change in the Amazon; processes of forest change at the local and landscape levels in Honduras and Guatemala; comparison of aboveground biomass across Amazon sites; the opportunities and challenges of research in Africa and Asia as compared to research in the Americas with respect to land tenure, land-cover change history, population characteristics, and other factors that impact human-environment interactions; and a meta-analysis of agricultural change. Contributors include geologists, anthropologists, and environmental scientists. Moran is at Indiana University and its Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental Change and its Anthropological Center for Training and Research on Global Environmental Change. Ostrom is at Indiana University and with its Center for the Study of Institutions, Population and Environmental Change. Index.

Update Code

200904

<22>

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0665779

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor; Ahn, T. K., eds.

Titolo:

Foundations of social capital.

Sta in:

Elgar Reference Collection. Critical Studies in Economic Institutions, vol. 2. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: Elgar; distributed by American International Distribution Corporation, Williston, Vt.. p xxxix, 590. 2003.

Abstract

Twenty-three previously published papers represent foundational and contemporary contributions to the concept of social capital and the social capital research paradigm. Contains very early contributions, published between 1840 and 1961; provides contemporary conceptual and philosophical foundations in the form of papers published between 1973 and 1988; and presents more recent work dealing with forms of social capital, social capital and development, and social capital and democracy. Ostrom is at Indiana University. Ahn is at Florida State University. Name index.

Update Code

200904

<23>

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0658287

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor; Walker, James, eds.

Titolo:

Trust and reciprocity: Interdisciplinary lessons from experimental research.

Sta in:

Series on Trust, vol. 6. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. p xiii, 409. 2003.

Abstract

Thirteen papers, resulting from a series of meetings on trust held at the Russell Sage Foundation, examine the foundations for trust and trustworthiness. Papers discuss steps toward a behavioral theory linking trust, reciprocity, and reputation; gaming trust; the biological foundations of reciprocity; the chimpanzee's service economy; a cognitive theory of reciprocal exchange; conflict, interpersonal assessment, and the evolution of cooperation; experimental studies of cooperation, trust, and social exchange; trust and reciprocity in sequential games; strategic assessment in games; trust in children; trust in two-person games; cross-societal experimentation on trust; and what nonexperimentalists can learn from experimentalists. Ostrom and Walker are at Indiana University. Glossary; index.

Update Code

200904

<24>

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0998940

Autori:

Blomquist, William; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Symposium in Honour of Viktor Vanburg: Deliberation, Learning, and Institutional Change: The Evolution of Institutions in Judicial Settings.

Sta in:

Constitutional Political Economy. Vol. 19 (3). p 180-202. September 2008.

Abstract

Institutional change entails institutional design, assessment, and modification, which necessarily take place within the constraints and opportunities afforded by existing institutional arrangements. Viktor Vanberg has made major contributions to our understanding of how institutions evolve. We wish to contribute to this symposium in honor of Vanberg by analyzing how institutions for the management of water institutions in Southern California evolved primarily through the use of the courts as settings for deliberation, learning and institutional change.

Update Code

200811

<25>

0976344

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Challenges and Growth: The Development of the Interdisciplinary Field of Institutional Analysis.

Sta in:

Journal of Institutional Economics. Vol. 3 (3). p 239-64. December 2007.

Abstract

This article briefly describes some of the intellectual challenges during the last half-century to the traditional fields of economics and political science: the public choice approach, the tragedy of the commons debate, the 'new' institutional economics, and behavioral game theory. Then, the components of a basic institutional analysis framework are presented that provide a general method for analyzing public economies and diverse forms of collective action. Empirical research related to metropolitan public economies, common-pool resources, and behavioral game theory is summarized that has contributed to the field of institutional analysis. The last section concludes that the macro foundations of institutional analysis appear firmer than the micro foundations related to the model of the individual to be used and discusses this puzzle.

Update Code

200806

<26>

0969410

Autori:

Andersson, Krister P; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Analyzing Decentralized Resource Regimes from a Polycentric Perspective.

Sta in:

Policy Sciences. Vol. 41 (1). p 71-93. March 2008.

Abstract

This article seeks to shed new light on the study of decentralized natural resource governance by applying institutional theories of polycentricity--the relationships among multiple authorities with overlapping jurisdictions. The emphasis on multi-level dynamics has not penetrated empirical studies of environmental policy reforms in non-industrial countries. On the contrary, many of today's decentralization proponents seem to be infatuated with the local sphere, expecting that local actors are always able and willing to govern their natural resources effectively. Existing studies in this area often focus exclusively on characteristics and performance of local institutions. While we certainly do not deny the importance of local institutions, we argue that institutional arrangements operating at other governance scales--such as national government agencies, international organizations, NGOs at multiple scales, and private associations--also often have critical roles to play in natural resource governance regimes, including self-organized regimes.

Update Code

200805

<27>

0966110

Autori:

Guha-Khasnobis, Basudeb; Kanbur, Ravi; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Beyond Formality and Informality.

Sta in:

Linking the Formal and Informal Economy: Concepts and Policies. Guha-Khasnobis, Basudeb. Kanbur, Ravi. Ostrom, Elinor, eds., UNU-WIDER Studies in Development Economics series. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. p 1-18. 2006.

Update Code

200804

<28>

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0966100

Autori:

Janssen, Marco A; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Adoption of a New Regulation for the Governance of Common-Pool Resources by a Heterogeneous Population.

Sta in:

Inequality, Cooperation, and Environmental Sustainability. Baland, Jean-Marie. Bardhan, Pranab. Bowles, Samuel, eds., New York: Russell Sage Foundation; Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. p 60-96. 2007.

Update Code

200804

<29>

.  
0946365

Autori:

Cox, James C; Ostrom, Elinor; Walker, James M; Castillo, Jamie; Coleman, Eric; Holahan, Robert; Schoon, Michael; Steed, Brian.

Titolo:

Trust in Private and Common Property Experiments.

Sta in:

Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series: 2007-11. p 28. 2007.

Abstract

We report the results from a series of experiments designed to investigate behavior in two settings that are frequently posited in the policy literature as generating different outcomes: private property and common property. The experimental settings closely parallel earlier experimental studies of the investment or trust game. The primary research question relates to the effect of the initial allocation of property rights on the level of trust that subjects will extend to others with whom they are linked. We find that assigning the initial endowments as common property of each of N pairs of a first mover and second mover leads to marginally greater cooperation or trust than when the initial endowments are fully owned by the two individual movers as their, respective, private property. Subjects' decisions are also shown to be correlated with attitudes toward trust and fairness that are measured in post-experiment questionnaires.

Update Code

200712

<30>

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0603467

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

The Evolution of Norms within Institutions: Comments on Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich's, 'Population, Development, and Human Nature.'

Sta in:

Environment and Development Economics. Vol. 7 (1). p 177-82. February 2002.

Update Code

200710

<31>

.  
0926382

Autori:

Hess, Charlotte; Ostrom, Elinor, eds.

Titolo:

Understanding Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory to Practice.

Sta in:

Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press. p xiii, 367. 2007.

## Abstract

Eleven papers, originally presented at the "Workshop on Scholarly Communication as a Commons" held in the spring of 2004, consider historically the concept of the knowledge commons in the digital era and offer an analytical framework for understanding knowledge as a shared social-ecological system. Papers discuss the growth of the commons paradigm (David Bollier); a framework for analyzing the knowledge commons (Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess); countering enclosure--reclaiming the knowledge commons (Nancy Kranich); Mertonianism unbound--imagining free, decentralized access to most cultural and scientific material (James Boyle); preserving the knowledge commons (Donald J. Waters); creating an intellectual commons through open access (Peter Suber); how to build a commons--whether intellectual property is constrictive, facilitating, or irrelevant (Shubha Ghosh); collective action, civic engagement, and the knowledge commons (Peter Levine); free/open-source software as a framework for establishing commons in science (Charles M. Schweik); scholarly communication and libraries unbound--the opportunity of the commons (Wendy Pradt Lougee); and EconPort--creating and maintaining a knowledge commons (James C. Cox and J. Todd Swarhout). Hess is Director of the Digital Library of the Commons at Indian University. Ostrom is Arthur F. Bentley Professor of Political Science, Codirector of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, and Codirector of the Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental Change at Indiana University. Glossary; index.

Update Code

200709

<32>

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0904314

Autori:

Guha-Khasnobis, Basudeb; Kanbur, Ravi; Ostrom, Elinor, eds.

Titolo:

Linking the Formal and Informal Economy: Concepts and Policies.

Sta in:

UNU-WIDER Studies in Development Economics series. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. p xvii, 294. 2006.

Abstract

Fourteen papers, originally presented at a conference organized by the Expert Group on Development Issues and held in Helsinki in September 2004, explore issues in formality and informality in developing countries. Papers discuss bureaucratic form and the informal economy; the global path--soft law and nonsovereigns formalizing the potency of the informal sector; the relevance of the concepts of formality and informality--a theoretical appraisal; rethinking the informal economy--linkages with the formal economy and the formal regulatory environment; formal and informal enterprises--concept, definition, and measurement issues in India; the impact of regulation on growth and informality--cross-country evidence; financial liberalization in Vietnam--impact on loans from informal, formal, and semiformal providers; blocking human potential--how formal policies block the informal economy in the Maputo corridor; microinsurance for the informal economy workers in India; turning to forestry for a way out of poverty--whether formalizing property rights is enough; voluntary contributions to informal activities producing public goods--whether these can be induced by government and other formal sector agents--some evidence from Indonesian Posyandus; social capital, survival strategies, and their potential for postconflict governance in Liberia; enforcement and compliance in Lima's street markets--the origins and consequences of policy incoherence toward informal traders; and formalizing the informal--whether there is a way to safely unlock human potential through land entitlement--a review of changing land administration in Africa. Guha-Khasnobis is Research Fellow and Project Director at UNU-WIDER. Kanbur is T. H. Lee Professor of World Affairs, International Professor of Applied Economics and Management, and Professor of Economics at Cornell University. Ostrom is Arthur F. Bentley Professor of Political Science at Indiana University. Index.

Update Code

200706

<33>

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0879352

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

The Value-Added of Laboratory Experiments for the Study of Institutions and Common-Pool Resources.

Sta in:

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. Vol. 61 (2). p 149-63. October 2006.

Abstract

This article provides an overview of the effects of communication on experimental studies of behavior and outcomes in common-pool resource (CPR) dilemmas. Aggregate outcomes in CPR dilemmas without communication approximate predictions of non-cooperative game theory, but allowing cheap talk results in higher outcomes. When exogenous rules are monitored at realistic levels, subjects cheat even though following the rule would generate optimal outcomes. If given the opportunity, experimental subjects will devise their own rule systems and impose sanctions on each other. These findings complement field research on more complex resources and communities by confirming the critical importance of communication and endogenous rule formation.

Update Code

200612

<34>

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0873639

Autori:

Gibson, Clark C; Andersson, Krister; Ostrom, Elinor; Shivakumar, Sujai.

Titolo:

The Samaritan's Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid.

Sta in:

Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. p xx, 264. 2005.

Abstract

Introduces a new approach to the study of development aid that puts the institutional incentives at the center of the development process. Discusses what's wrong with development aid; the theoretical foundations for the study of development aid; better development through better policy--development aid's challenges at the collective-choice level; incentives across action situations in development aid; a formal analysis of incentives in strategic interactions involving an international development cooperation agency; the incentives of different types of aid; applying the Institutional Analysis and Development framework--the incentives inside a development agency; incentives for contractors in aid-supported activities; Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency aid in electricity and natural resource projects in India and Zambia; and what we have learned about aid. Gibson is at the University of California, San Diego. Andersson is at the University of Colorado, Boulder. Ostrom is at Indiana University. Shivakumar is with the United States National Academies' Board on Science, Technology, and Economic Policy. Bibliography; index.

Update Code

200611

<35>

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0865275

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor; Janssen, Marco A.

Titolo:

Multi-level Governance and Resilience of Social-Ecological Systems.

Sta in:

Globalisation, poverty and conflict: A critical 'development' reader. Spoor, Max, ed., Dordrecht; Boston and London: Kluwer Academic. p 239-59. 2004.

Update Code

200609

<36>

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0860578

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Doing Institutional Analysis: Digging Deeper than Markets and Hierarchies.

Sta in:

Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Menard, Claude. Shirley, Mary M., eds., Dordrecht and New York: Springer. p 819-48. 2005.

Update Code

200608

<37>

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0821537

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Understanding Institutional Diversity.

Sta in:

Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press. p xv, 355. 2005.

Abstract

Articulates the components of institutions and how they can be used to generate explanations of human behavior in diverse situations. Discusses the action situation as a focal unit of analysis and describes the basic working parts of an action situation. Provides a brief overview of two action situations that have been studied extensively in the experimental laboratories in many countries: the trust game and the commons dilemma. Discusses how to animate the institutional analysis by specifying key assumptions about the individual actors holding positions in the situation. Develops a grammar of institutions, elucidating a syntax that illustrates the similarities and differences between shared strategies, norms, and rules. Introduces an approach to classifying rules. Describes seven generic rules that individuals use when establishing or changing action situations they confront in everyday life. Applies these tools, and the framework developed, to a focused study of common-pool resource problems and discusses robust governance in polycentric institutions. Ostrom is Arthur F. Bentley Professor of Political Science and Codirector of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis and the Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental Change at Indiana University. Index.

Update Code

200600

<38>

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0822440

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Response to Zakir Husain and Rabindra Bhattacharya's "Common Pool Resources and Contextual Factors: Evolution of a Fishermen's Cooperative in Calcutta".

Sta in:

Ecological Economics. Vol. 55 (2). p 139-42. November 2005.

Update Code

200600

<39>

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0827060

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

An Agenda for the Study of Institutions.

Sta in:

The Foundations of the New Institutional Economics. Menard, Claude, ed., Elgar Reference Collection. International Library of the New Institutional Economics, vol. 1. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: Elgar. p 429-51. 2004. Previously Published: 1986.

Update Code

200600

<40>

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0830902

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997.

Sta in:

Transaction Costs and Property Rights. Menard, Claude, ed., Elgar Reference Collection. International Library of the New Institutional Economics, vol. 2. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: Elgar. p 110-31. 2004. Previously Published: 1998.

Update Code

200600

<41>

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0764471

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Achieving Progress in Solving Collective-Action Problems.

Sta in:

Making progress: Essays in progress and public policy. Anderson, C. Leigh. Looney, Janet W., eds., Lanham, Md. and Oxford: Lexington Books. p 165-90. 2002.

Update Code

200500

<42>

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0763595

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Common-Pool Resources and Institutions: Toward a Revised Theory.

Sta in:

Handbook of agricultural economics. Volume 2A. Agriculture and its external linkages. Gardner, Bruce L. Rausser, Gordon C., eds., Handbooks in Economics, vol. 18. Amsterdam; London and New York: Elsevier Science, North-Holland. p 1315-39. 2002.

Update Code

200500

<43>

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0763330

Autori:

Ostrom, Vincent; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Legal and Political Conditions of Water Resource Development.

Sta in:

Water resources and economic development. Saleth, R. Maria, ed., Elgar Reference Collection. Management of Water Resources, vol. 3. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: Elgar; distributed by American International Distribution Corporation, Williston, Vt.. p 308-21. 2002. Previously Published: 1972.

Update Code

200500

<44>

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0780402

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Design Principles in Long-Enduring Irrigation Institutions.

Sta in:

Property rights and environmental problems. Volume 2. Larson, Bruce A., ed., International Library of Environmental Economics and Policy. Aldershot, U.K. and Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate. p 445-50. 2003. Previously Published: 1993.

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0780366

Autori:

Schlager, Edella; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis.

Sta in:

Property rights and environmental problems. Volume 1. Larson, Bruce A., ed., International Library of Environmental Economics and Policy. Aldershot, U.K. and Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate. p 165-78. 2003. Previously Published: 1992.

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0778732

Autori:

Dolsak, Nives; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

The Challenges of the Commons.

Sta in:

The commons in the new millennium: Challenges and adaptation. Dolsak, Nives. Ostrom, Elinor, eds., Politics, Science and the Environment series. Cambridge and London: MIT Press. p 3-34. 2003.

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Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Reformulating the Commons.

Sta in:

Environment in the new global economy. Volume 1. Analytic approaches to the IPE of the environment. Haas, Peter M., ed., Elgar Reference Collection. International Library of Writings on the New Global Economy, vol. 1. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: Elgar. p 118-42. 2003. Previously Published: 2001.

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0674573

Autori:

Ahn, T. K; Ostrom, Elinor; Walker, James M.

Titolo:

Heterogeneous Preferences and Collective Action.

Sta in:

Public Choice. Vol. 117 (3-4). p 295-314. December 2003.

Abstract

In recent years, scholars have turned to alternative representations of utility to capture motivational heterogeneity across individuals. In the research reported here, we examine two models of heterogeneous utility--linear-altruism and inequity-aversion--in the context of two-person, social dilemma games. Empirical tests are conducted drawing on data from experiments and surveys. We find that the model of inequity-aversion accounts for a substantial proportion of the preference types and behavior that are not explained by the standard model of self-interested preferences. In contrast, the altruism model does not provide a significant increase in explanatory power over the inequity-aversion model.

Update Code

200400

<49>

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0680503

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor; Ostrom, Vincent.

Titolo:

The Quest for Meaning in Public Choice.

Sta in:

American Journal of Economics and Sociology. Vol. 63 (1). p 105-47. Special Issue January 2004.

Abstract

The logical foundations of constitutional government are of basic importance if people are to be self-governing. All forms of political order are Faustian bargains subject to numerous risks. If constitutional choice applies to all patterns of human association, the complexity of associated relationships and the potential threats to the viability of associated relationships in the aggregate exceed the limits of human cognition. The development of analytical capabilities depends on using frameworks, theories, and models for formulating hypotheses about conditions and consequences, undertaking diagnostic assessments, and conceptualizing and designing alternative possibilities. The relationship of ideas to deeds in an experimental epistemology is necessary to achieve a warrantable art and science of association.

Update Code

200400

<50>

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0743009

Autori:

Poteete, Amy R; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Heterogeneity, Group Size and Collective Action: The Role of Institutions in Forest Management.

Sta in:

Development and Change. Vol. 35 (3). p 435-61. June 2004.

Abstract

Collective action for sustainable management among resource-dependent populations has important policy implications. Despite considerable progress in identifying factors that affect the prospects for collective action, no consensus exists about the role played by heterogeneity and size of group. The debate continues in part because of a lack of uniform conceptualization of these factors, the existence of nonlinear relationships, and the mediating role played by institutions. This article draws on research by scholars in the International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) research network which demonstrates that some forms of heterogeneity do not negatively affect some forms of collective action. More importantly, IFRI research draws out the interrelations among group size, heterogeneity, and institutions. Institutions can affect the level of heterogeneity or compensate for it. Group size appears to have a nonlinear relationship to at least some forms of collective action. Moreover, group size may be as much an indicator of institutional success as a precondition for such success.

Update Code

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<51>

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0640152

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action.

Sta in:

Polycentric games and institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. p 472-521. 2000. Previously Published: 1998.

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0640151

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor; Walker, James.

Titolo:

Neither Markets nor States: Linking Transformation Processes in Collective Action Areas.

Sta in:

Polycentric games and institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. p 427-71. 2000. Previously Published: 1997.

Update Code

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0640150

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor; Gardner, Roy.

Titolo:

Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work.

Sta in:

Polycentric games and institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. p 399-420. 2000. Previously Published: 1993.

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0640149

Autori:

Weissing, Franz J; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Irrigation Institutions and the Games Irrigators Play: Rule Enforcement on Government- and Farmer-Managed Systems.

Sta in:

Polycentric games and institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. p 366-98. 2000. Previously Published: 1993.

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0640140

Autori:

Crawford, Sue E. S; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

A Grammar of Institutions.

Sta in:

Polycentric games and institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. p 114-55. 2000. Previously Published: 1995.

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0640139

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

An Agenda for the Study of Institutions.

Sta in:

Polycentric games and institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. p 89-113. 2000. Previously Published: 1986.

Update Code

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0640138

Autori:

Kiser, Larry L; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

The Three Worlds of Action: A Metatheoretical Synthesis of Institutional Approaches.

Sta in:

Polycentric games and institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. p 56-88. 2000. Previously Published: 1982.

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0640137

Autori:

Ostrom, Vincent; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Public Choice: A Different Approach to the Study of Public Administration.

Sta in:

Polycentric games and institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. p 34-55. 2000. Previously Published: 1971.

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200300

<59>

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0647110

Autori:

Hess, Charlotte; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities: Information as a Common-Pool Resource.

Sta in:  
Law and Contemporary Problems. Vol. 66 (1-2). p 111-45. Winter-Spring 2003.  
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<60>

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0658668  
Autori:  
Dolsak, Nives; Ostrom, Elinor, eds.  
Titolo:  
The commons in the new millennium: Challenges and adaptation.

Sta in:  
Politics, Science and the Environment series. Cambridge and London: MIT Press. p xxiv, 369. 2003.

Abstract

Nine papers, presented at the 2000 International Association for the Study of Common Property conference held in Bloomington, Indiana, analyze new challenges that owners, managers, policymakers, and analysts face in managing natural commons such as forests, water resources, and fisheries. Papers discuss change in the territorial system of the Maine lobster industry; transition in the American fishing commons; the implications of scale for forest definition and management; fishers' experiences with New Zealand's market-based fisheries management; individual transferable quotas in Icelandic fisheries, 1991-2001; multilateral emission trading; how local forest tenure is shaped by national politics, with special reference to Indonesia; a framework for analyzing the physical, social, and human-capital effects of microcredit on common pool resources; and whether local communities can use the social capital formed for communal-resource management to create political capital, focusing on the case of devolution in Thailand's forestry sector. Dolsak is at the University of Washington, Bothell. Ostrom is at Indiana University. Index.

Update Code  
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0664810  
Autori:  
Ostrom, Elinor.  
Titolo:  
Private and Common Property Rights.

Sta in:  
Encyclopedia of law and economics. Volume 2. Civil law and economics. Bouckaert, Boudewijn. De Geest, Gerrit, eds., Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: Elgar; distributed by American International Distribution Corporation, Williston, Vt.. p 332-79. 2000.

Update Code  
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<62>

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0592866  
Autori:  
Parks, Roger B; Ostrom, Elinor.  
Titolo:  
Complex Models of Urban Service Systems.

Sta in:  
Polycentricity and local public economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. p 355-80. 1999. Previously Published: 1981.

Update Code  
200200

<63>

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0592862

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor; Parks, Roger B.

Titolo:

Neither Gargantua nor the Land of Lilliputs: Conjectures on Mixed Systems of Metropolitan Organization.

Sta in:

Polycentricity and local public economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. p 284-305. 1999.

Update Code

200200

<64>

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0592861

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor; Parks, Roger B; Whitaker, Gordon P.

Titolo:

Defining and Measuring Structural Variations in Interorganizational Arrangements.

Sta in:

Polycentricity and local public economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. p 265-83. 1999. Previously Published: 1974.

Update Code

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<65>

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0592860

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Size and Performance in a Federal System.

Sta in:

Polycentricity and local public economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. p 232-62. 1999. Previously Published: 1976.

Update Code

200200

<66>

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0592859

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor; Whitaker, Gordon P.

Titolo:

Community Control and Governmental Responsiveness: The Case of Police in Black Neighborhoods.

Sta in:

Polycentricity and local public economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. p 203-31. 1999. Previously Published: 1974.

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<67>

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0592858

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor; Whitaker, Gordon P.

Titolo:

Does Local Community Control of Police Make a Difference? Some Preliminary Findings.

Sta in:

Polycentricity and local public economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. p 176-202. 1999. Previously Published: 1973.

Update Code

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0592857

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Why Do We Need Multiple Indicators of Public Service Outputs?

Sta in:

Polycentricity and local public economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. p 163-75. 1999. Previously Published: 1977.

Update Code

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0592856

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Metropolitan Reform: Propositions Derived from Two Traditions.

Sta in:

Polycentricity and local public economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. p 139-60. 1999. Previously Published: 1972.

Update Code

200200

<70>

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0592854

Autori:

Ostrom, Vincent; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

A Behavioral Approach to the Study of Intergovernmental Relations.

Sta in:

Polycentricity and local public economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. p 107-18. 1999. Previously Published: 1965.

Update Code

200200

<71>

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0592853

Autori:

Ostrom, Vincent; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Public Goods and Public Choices.

Sta in:

Polycentricity and local public economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. p 75-103. 1999. Previously Published: 1977.

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200200

<72>

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0613142

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor, et al., eds.

Titolo:

The drama of the commons.

Sta in:

Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. p xii, 521. 2002.

Abstract

Thirteen papers examine what has been learned over decades of research into how the drama of commons plays out. Papers address common resources and institutional sustainability; heterogeneity and commons management in large-scale multivariate research; a review of experimental psychological research of factors influencing cooperation in commons dilemmas; a theoretical explanation for appropriating the commons; the tradable permits approach to protecting the commons; comparing community-based management to tradable environmental allowances; the environmental consequences of cross-scale interactions; perspectives from the bottom-up of cross-scale institutional linkages; scientific uncertainty, complex systems, and the design of common-pool institutions; emergence of institutions for the commons; an evolutionary theory of commons management; and knowledge and questions after fifteen years of research. Co-editors include Thomas Dietz, Nives Dolsak, Paul C. Stern, Susan Stonich, and Elke U. Weber. Ostrom is the Arthur F. Bentley Professor of Political Science and co-director of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis and of the Center for the Study of Institutions, Population and Environmental Change at Indiana University. Index.

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200200

<73>

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0577227

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Norms and Efficiency.

Sta in:

Recasting egalitarianism: New rules for communities, states and markets. Bowles, Samuel. Gintis, Herbert., With contributions by Harry Brighouse et al. Edited and introduced by Erik Olin Wright. Real Utopias Project, vol. 3. London and New York: New Left Books, Verso. p 113-20. 1998.

Update Code

200100

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0549121

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

The Institutional Analysis and Development Approach.

Sta in:

Designing institutions for environmental and resource management. Loehman, Edna Tusak. Kilgour, D. Marc, eds., New Horizons in Environmental Economics. Cheltenham, U.K. and Northampton, Mass.: Elgar; distributed by American International Distribution Corporation, Williston, Vt.. p 68-90. 1998.

Update Code

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0569404

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Crossing the Great Divide: Coproduction, Synergy, and Development.

Sta in:

Polycentric governance and development: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. p 346-74. 1999. Previously Published: 1996.

Update Code

200100

<76>

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0569394

Autori:

Schlager, Edella; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Property Rights Regimes and Coastal Fisheries: An Empirical Analysis.

Sta in:

Polycentric governance and development: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. p 87-113. 1999. Previously Published: 1993.

Update Code

200100

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0569393

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Design Principles in Long-Enduring Irrigation Institutions.

Sta in:

Polycentric governance and development: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. p 74-86. 1999. Previously Published: 1993.

Update Code

200100

<78>

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0569392

Autori:

Blomquist, William; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Institutional Capacity and the Resolution of a Commons Dilemma.

Sta in:

Polycentric governance and development: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. p 60-73. 1999. Previously Published: 1985.

Update Code

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0569391

Autori:

Ostrom, Vincent; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Legal and Political Conditions of Water Resource Development.

Sta in:

Polycentric governance and development: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis. McGinnis, Michael D., ed., Institutional Analysis series. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. p 42-59. 1999. Previously Published: 1972.

Update Code

200100

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0574343

Autori:

Levi, Margaret; Ostrom, Elinor; Alt, James E.

Titolo:

Competition and Cooperation: Conclusion.

Sta in:

Competition and cooperation: Conversations with Nobelists about economics and political science. Alt, James E. Levi, Margaret. Ostrom, Elinor, eds., New York: Russell Sage Foundation. p 331-37. 1999.

Update Code

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0574319

Autori:

Alt, James E; Levi, Margaret; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Competition and Cooperation: Introduction.

Sta in:

Competition and cooperation: Conversations with Nobelists about economics and political science. Alt, James E. Levi, Margaret. Ostrom, Elinor, eds., New York: Russell Sage Foundation. p xv-xix. 1999.

Update Code

200100

<82>

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0576481

Autori:

Varughese, George; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

The Contested Role of Heterogeneity in Collective Action: Some Evidence from Community Forestry in Nepal.

Sta in:

World Development. Vol. 29 (5). p 747-65. May 2001.

Abstract

The role of heterogeneity in affecting the likelihood of collective action is strongly debated in the theoretical literature. We present evidence from a study of 18 forest user groups in Nepal. Heterogeneity is not a strong predictor of the level of collective activity. Rather, heterogeneity is a challenge that can be overcome by good institutional design when the interests of those controlling collective-choice mechanisms are benefited by investing time and effort to craft better rules.

Update Code

200100

<83>

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0518715

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Investing in Capital, Institutions, and Incentives.

Sta in:

Institutions and economic development: Growth and governance in less-developed and post-socialist countries. Clague, Christopher, ed., Johns Hopkins Studies in Development. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press. p 153-81. 1997.

Update Code

200000

<84>

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0516379

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor; Gardner, Roy; Walker, James.

Titolo:

Theory, Field, and Laboratory: The Continuing Dialogue.

Sta in:

Understanding strategic interaction: Essays in honor of Reinhard Selten. Albers, Wulf\_et al., eds., Edited with the help of Martin Strobel. Heidelberg and New York: Springer. p 386-93. 1997.

Update Code

200000

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0516049

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor; Walker, James.

Titolo:

Neither Markets nor States: Linking Transformation Processes in Collective Action Arenas.

Sta in:

Perspectives on public choice: A handbook. Mueller, Dennis C., ed., Cambridge; New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press. p 35-72. 1997.

Update Code

200000

<86>

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0514647

Autori:

Alt, James E; Levi, Margaret; Ostrom, Elinor, eds.

Titolo:

Competition and cooperation: Conversations with Nobelists about economics and political science.

Sta in:

New York: Russell Sage Foundation. p xix, 347. 1999.

Abstract

Twelve papers, with responses, represent a conversation between political scientists and Nobel Prize-winning economists concerning the contribution of economics to political science. Papers by political scientists assess the influence on their discipline of each of six Nobel Prize-winning economists--Kenneth J. Arrow, Herbert A. Simon, James M. Buchanan, Gary S. Becker, Douglass C. North, and Reinhard Selten--and the Nobelists respond to the assessments of their personal influence. Five additional papers and comments by some of the Nobelists discuss research programs in constitutional political economy; the coming marriage of political and economic theory; political science; and discovery and verification in the methodology of science. Also includes biographical sketches of the Nobel economists. Alt is with the Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences, Harvard University. Levi is at the University of

Washington Center for Labor Studies. Ostrom is with the Center for the Study of Institutions, Population, and Environmental Change at Indiana University. Index.

Update Code  
200000

<87>

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0526278

Autori:

Gibson, Clark C; Ostrom, Elinor; Ahn, T. K.

Titolo:

The Concept of Scale and the Human Dimensions of Global Change: A Survey.

Sta in:

Ecological Economics. Vol. 32 (2). p 217-39. February 2000.

Abstract

Issues related to the scale of ecological phenomena are of fundamental importance to their study. The causes and consequences of environmental change can, of course, be measured at different levels and along multiple scales. While the natural sciences have long understood the importance of scale, research regarding scale in the social sciences has been less explicit, less precise, and more variable. The growing need for interdisciplinary work across the natural/social science divide, however, demands that each achieve some common understandings about scaling issues. This survey seeks to facilitate the dialogue between natural and social scientists by reviewing some of the more important aspects of the concept of scale employed in the social sciences, especially as they relate to the human dimensions of global environmental change. The survey presents the fundamentals of scale, examines four general scaling issues typical of social science, and explores how different social science disciplines have used scale in their research.

Update Code

200000

<88>

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0469163

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor; Schlager, Edella.

Titolo:

The Formation of Property Rights.

Sta in:

Rights to nature: Ecological, economic, cultural, and political principles of institutions for the environment. Hanna, Susan. Folke, Carl. Maler, Karl-Goran, eds., Washington, D.C.: Island Press. p 127-56. 1996.

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<89>

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0463558

Autori:

McGinnis, Michael; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Design Principles for Local and Global Commons.

Sta in:

The international political economy and international institutions. Volume 2. Young, Oran R., ed., Elgar Reference Collection. Library of International Political Economy, vol. 10. Cheltenham, U.K.: Elgar; distributed by Ashgate, Brookfield, Vt.. p 464-93. 1996. Previously Published: 1992.

Update Code

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0460561

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Incentives, Rules of the Game, and Development.

Sta in:

Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, 1995. Bruno, Michael. Pleskovic, Boris, eds., Washington, D.C.: World Bank. p 207-34. 1996.

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0447526

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Designing Complexity to Govern Complexity.

Sta in:

Property rights and the environment: Social and ecological issues. Hanna, Susan. Munasinghe, Mohan, eds., Stockholm: Beijer International Institute of Ecological Economics; Washington, D.C.: World Bank. p 33-45. 1995.

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<92>

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0453880

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997.

Sta in:

American Political Science Review. Vol. 92 (1). p 1-22. March 1998.

Update Code

199800

<93>

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0473390

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

The Comparative Study of Public Economies.

Sta in:

American Economist. Vol. 42 (1). p 3-17. Spring 1998.

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199800

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0383596

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Self-organization and Social Capital.

Sta in:

Industrial and Corporate Change. Vol. 4 (1). p 131-59. 1995.

Update Code

199600

<95>

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0393807

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Crossing the Great Divide: Coproduction, Synergy, and Development.

Sta in:

World Development. Vol. 24 (6). p 1073-87. June 1996.

Abstract

Coproduction is a process through which inputs from individuals who are not "in" the same organization are transformed into goods and services. Two cases are presented--one from Brazil and one from Nigeria--where public officials play a major role. In Brazil, public officials actively encourage a high level of citizen input to the production of urban infrastructure. In Nigeria, public officials discourage citizen contributions to primary education. The third section of the paper provides a brief overview of the theory of coproduction and its relevance for understanding the two cases. The last section addresses the implications of coproduction in polycentric systems for synergy and development.

Update Code

199600

<96>

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0323631

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Design Principles in Long-Enduring Irrigation Institutions.

Sta in:

Water Resources Research. Vol. 29 (7). p 1907-12. July 1993.

Update Code

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<97>

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0322518

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor; Gardner, Roy.

Titolo:

Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work.

Sta in:

Journal of Economic Perspectives. Vol. 7 (4). p 93-112. Fall 1993.

Update Code

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<98>

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0343778

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor; Gardner, Roy; Walker, James.

Titolo:

Rules, games, and common-pool resources.

Sta in:

With Arun Agrawal et al. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. p xvi, 369. 1994.

Abstract

Uses both experimental and field data to test models of behavior in common-pool resource situations that are based on the theory of N-person, finitely repeated games. Tests the formal models in the controlled environment of an experimental laboratory to examine more closely the conditions under which the theoretical results predicted by noncooperative game theory are supported and where the theory fails. Reports on experimental studies dealing with

appropriation behavior; probabilistic destruction of the common pool resource; communication in the commons; and sanctioning and communication institutions. Considers regularities from the laboratory experiments and possible explanations, focusing on why there was so much cooperation in the communication experiments. Edella Schlager, Shui Yan Tang, Arun Agrawal, and William Blomquist each present findings from four field settings--fisheries, irrigation systems, forests, and groundwater basins--to assess the generality of the findings from controlled experiments, and examine the institutional and physical variables that affect self-organization among common pool resource appropriators. Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker are at Indiana University. Bibliography; index.

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199400

<99>

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0275191

Autori:

Schlager, Edella; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis.

Sta in:

Land Economics. Vol. 68 (3). p 249-62. August 1992.

Abstract

The term "common-property resource" is an example of a term repeatedly used to refer to property owned by a government or by no one. It is also used for property owned by a community of resource users. Such usage leads to confusion in scientific study and policy analysis. In this paper, the authors develop a conceptual schema for arraying property-rights regimes that distinguishes among diverse bundles of rights ranging from authorized user, to claimant, to proprietor, and to owner. They apply this conceptual schema to analyze findings from a variety of empirical settings including the Maine lobster industry.

Update Code

199300

<100>

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0286752

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor; Walker, James; Gardner, Roy.

Titolo:

Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible.

Sta in:

American Political Science Review. Vol. 86 (2). p 404-17. June 1992.

Update Code

199300

<101>

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0386137

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor; Walker, James; Gardner, Roy.

Titolo:

Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible.

Sta in:

The political economy of customs and culture: Informal solutions to the commons problem.. Anderson, Terry L. Simmons, Randy T., eds., The Political Economy Forum series. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield. p 127-56. 1993. Previously Published: 1992.

Update Code

199300

<102>

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0386131

Autori:

Schlager, Edella; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Property-Rights Regimes and Coastal Fisheries: An Empirical Analysis.

Sta in:

The political economy of customs and culture: Informal solutions to the commons problem.. Anderson, Terry L. Simmons, Randy T., eds., The Political Economy Forum series. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield. p 13-41. 1993.

Update Code

199300

<103>

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0273086

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Crafting institutions for self-governing irrigation systems.

Sta in:

San Francisco: ICS Press. p xiv, 111. 1992.

Abstract

Outlines an approach to designing irrigation institutions. Contends that the crafting of institutions is an ongoing process that must directly involve the users and supplier of an irrigation system throughout the design process. Stresses the significance of viewing institutions as "rules-in-use" rather than as paper organizations created by formal legislation without participation of those affected. Discusses crafting rules for varying environmental and cultural traditions; crafting rules to counteract opportunistic behavior; crafting monitoring, sanctioning, and conflict resolution mechanisms; and crafting rules in ongoing processes. Presents design principles derived from an intensive study of several long-enduring self-organized irrigation systems. Discusses the problems of applying these design criteria in efforts to improve both government-owned and farmer-owned irrigation systems, and presents proposals for reform. Ostrom is Arthur F. Bentley Professor of Political Science at Indiana University. No index.

Update Code

199300

<104>

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0292024

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor; Schroeder, Larry; Wynne, Susan.

Titolo:

Institutional incentives and sustainable development: Infrastructure policies in perspective.

Sta in:

Theoretical Lenses on Public Policy series. Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press. p xxi, 266. 1993.

Abstract

Discusses the problem of insufficient maintenance of rural infrastructure facilities and describes a method for conducting a systematic comparison of alternative institutional arrangements for the development and maintenance of rural infrastructure facilities in developing countries. Examines the role of infrastructure in development; the problem of sustainable infrastructure; the problems of information, coordination, and control; and the provision and production of rural infrastructure. Presents overall and intermediate performance criteria against which alternative institutional arrangements can be evaluated and uses the criteria to evaluate centralized, decentralized, and polycentric institutional arrangements. Discusses the policy implications of an institutional approach to sustainable development. Ostrom and Wynne are at Indiana University. Schroeder is at Syracuse University. Index.

Update Code

199300

<105>

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0262359

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action.

Sta in:

Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions series Cambridge; New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press. p xviii, 280. 1990.

Abstract

Analyzes empirical examples of successful and unsuccessful efforts to govern and manage natural resources, critiquing the foundations of policy analysis as applied to many natural resources. Introduces the institutional approach to the study of self-organization and self-governance in common-pool resource situations. Focuses on cases of successful, long-enduring, self-organized, and self-governed management of common-pool resources, examining the organization of mountain grazing and forest common-pool resources in Switzerland and Japan, and some irrigation systems in Spain and the Philippines. Analyzes institutional change in the case of a set of institutions to manage a series of groundwater basins located beneath the Los Angeles metropolitan area. Investigates cases of institutional failure and fragility involving extreme rent dissipation, unresolved disagreements leading to physical violence, or resource deteriorations. Discusses, in this context, fisheries in Turkey; groundwater in San Bernadino County, California; and fisheries and irrigation systems in Sri Lanka. Considers the implications for the design of self-organizing and self-governing institutions. Ostrom is at Indiana University. Index.

Update Code

199200

<106>

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0242593

Autori:

Walker, James M; Gardner, Roy; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Rent Dissipation in a Limited-Access Common-Pool Resource: Experimental Evidence.

Sta in:

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. Vol. 19 (3). p 203-11. November 1990.

Abstract

This paper examines group behavior in an experimental environment designed to parallel the conditions specified in noncooperative models of limited-access common-pool resources. Using experimental methods, we investigate the strength of theoretical models which predict that users of such resources will appropriate units at a rate at which the marginal returns from appropriation are greater than the marginal appropriation costs. Our results confirm the prediction of suboptimal accrual of rents and offer evidence on the effects of increasing investment capital available to appropriators.

Update Code

199100

<107>

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0246793

Autori:

Gardner, Roy; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Rules and Games.

Sta in:

Public Choice. Vol. 70 (2). p 121-49. May 1991.

Abstract

This paper reconsiders the relationship between the rules of a game and its outcomes. The authors develop a notion of rule reform that leads to the selection of Pareto improved equilibria points. They then apply this notion to a series of naturally occurring fishing rules, including examples from Malaysia, India, Brazil, Turkey, and Canada. The authors show that reforming a game is conceptually akin to reforming an economy.

Update Code

199100

<108>

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0337679

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor; Walker, James M.

Titolo:

Communication in a Commons: Cooperation without External Enforcement.

Sta in:

Laboratory research in political economy. Palfrey, Thomas R., ed., Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. p 287-322. 1991.

Update Code

199100

<109>

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0336981

Autori:

Walker, James M; Gardner, Roy; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Rent Dissipation and Balanced Deviation Disequilibrium in Common Pool Resources: Experimental Evidence.

Sta in:

Game equilibrium models II. Methods, morals, and markets. Selten, Reinhard, ed., With contributions by D. Abreu et al New York; Berlin; London and Tokyo: Springer. p 337-67. 1991.

Update Code

199100

<110>

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0336977

Autori:

Weissing, Franz J; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Irrigation Institutions and the Games Irrigators Play: Rule Enforcement without Guards.

Sta in:

Game equilibrium models II. Methods, morals, and markets. Selten, Reinhard, ed., With contributions by D. Abreu et al New York; Berlin; London and Tokyo: Springer. p 188-262. 1991.

Update Code

199100

<111>

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0342962

Autori:

Ostrom, Vincent; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Public Goods and Public Choices: The Emergence of Public Economies and Industry Structures.

Sta in:

The meaning of American federalism: Constituting a self-governing society. Ostrom, Vincent., San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies; distributed by National Book Network, Lanham, Md.. p 163-97. 1991. Previously Published: 1977.

Update Code

199100

<112>

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0191532

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

An Agenda for the Study of Institutions.

Sta in:

Public Choice. Vol. 48 (1). p 3-25. 1986.

Update Code

198600

<113>

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0081576

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Exclusion, Choice and Divisibility: Factors Affecting the Measurement of Urban Agency Output and Impact.

Sta in:

Social Science Quarterly. Vol. 54 (4). p 691-99. March 1974.

Update Code

197400

<114>

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0070146

Autori:

Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Metropolitan Reform: Propositions Derived from Two Traditions.

Sta in:

Social Science Quarterly. Vol. 53 (3). p 474-93. December 1972.

Update Code

197200

<115>

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0065812

Autori:

Ostrom, Vincent; Ostrom, Elinor.

Titolo:

Legal and Political Conditions of Water Resource Development.

Sta in:

Land Economics. Vol. 48 (1). p 1-14. February 1972.

Update Code

197200